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TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT:
AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
AMONG CANADA, THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO
Richard Kyle Paisley, Cuauhtemoc Leon, Boris Graizbord and
Eugene C. Bricklemyer, Jr *
I. INTRODUCTION
Canada, the United States and Mexico are adjacent coastal nations.
They share numerous important transboundary natural resources, including
a significant number of international fresh water drainage basins. Bilateral
institutions have been established over the years to deal with the conserva-
tion and management of these international drainage basins. Prominent
among these have been the International Joint Commission (iC) between
Canada and the United States, and the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC) between the United States and Mexico.
The geographic scopes of the IJC and the IBWC are enormous.
"Canada and the United States share a 6,400 km boundary between the
main portions of their provinces and states, and an additional 2,400 km
between the Canadian Northwest Territories and Alaska."' Crossing these
boundaries are some of the richest and most prolific waterways in the
world, not least of which are the vast water resources of the five Great
Lakes.
• This is the first in a series of six related papers appearing in this volume. For
biographies of the individual authors of this paper, please see 9 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 174
(2004).
I. Aaron T. Wolf, Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned, 32
available at http://www.water-2001 .de/codoc/transboundarywaters.pdf(last visited Feb.
25, 2004) [hereinafter Wolf].
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In comparison, the United States and Mexico share a 3,141 lan long
boundary not including maritime areas.2 The United States/Mexico boundary
follows the middle of the Rio Grande from its mouth on the Gulf
of Mexico a distance of 1,254 miles (2,019 kin) to a point just
upstream of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Judrez, Chihuahua; then it
follows an alignment westward overland and marked by monu-
ments a distance of 533 miles (858 km) to the Colorado River;
thence it follows the middle of that river northward a distance of
24 miles (38 In); and then it again follows an alignment westward
overland and marked by monuments a distance of 141 miles (226
Iam) to the Pacific Ocean.3
The region along the boundary is characterized by deserts, rugged
mountains and abundant sunshine. The two main rivers, the Colorado
River and the Rio Grande, provide life-giving waters to the largely arid but
fertile lands along the rivers in both countries. Although sparsely settled,
the region rapidly developed, beginning with the coming of the railroads in
the 1880s and the development of irrigated agriculture after the turn of the
century. In 1981, more than 810,000 hectares were irrigated in the border
area with waters of the boundary rivers.
Today, the United States/Mexico boundary is singularly characterized
by fourteen pairs of sister cities sustained by agriculture, import-export
trade, service and tourism, and, in recent years, a growing manufacturing
sector. The borderlands population has grown to over eleven million
people and is expected to reach 19.4 million by 2020.' A high projection
for 2000 is estimated to be 12.4 million and a low projection for that year
is estimated at 11.5 million.5 The objectives of this paper are to: (1)
introduce the subject of international drainage basins and the laws that
govern their utilization; (2) describe the origins and operation of the ICJ
and the IBWC; (3) make observations regarding the operation of the IJC
and IBWC; and (4) assess the HC and the IBWC as models for the
sustainable management of international shared natural resources.
2. The International Boundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization and
Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, available at http://www.ibwc.
state.gov/ORGANIZA/aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
3. Id.
4. US.-Mexico Border EnvironmentalProgram: Border 2012, available at http://www.
epa.gov/usmexicoborder/index.htn#mission (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
5. J. Peach & J. Williams, Population and Economy on the US.-Mexico Border: Past,
Present and Future in The U.S.-Mexican Border Environment: A Road Map to a
Sustainable 2020, available at www.scerp.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
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I. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS6
The Helsinki Rules define an "international drainage basin" as "a
geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the
watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and under-
ground waters, flowing into a common'terminus."7 There are currently
over 260 international drainage basins in the world that are shared between
two or more sovereign nations.'
International law governs the utilization of international drainage
basins.' It is "composed of decisions about events that have effects across
national boundaries or on more than one nation, state or entity," and it
provides expectations about behavior in particular circumstances.'" There
are two principal means of creating international law. The first is by
explicit agreement, such as the express concurrence of the position of states
or international bodies in international treaty obligations (international
treaty law). These international treaty obligations can be multilateral" or
bilateral. Both the UC and the IBWC are examples of international legal
institutions created by bilateral international treaties.'
The second principal means of creating international law is by custom,
such as the practices of states or international bodies that are relatively
uniform, generally accepted and enforced by a relevant community of states
(customary international law). 3 Customary international law, in compari-
son to international treaty law, deals in broader concepts, is more difficult
6. See Richard Kyle Paisley & Timothy L. McDaniels, International Water Law,
Acceptable Pollution Risk and the Tatshenshini River, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111 (1995)
[hereinafter Paisley].
7. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, available at
http://www.intemationalwaterlaw.org /IntlDocs/HelsinkiRules.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
. 8. The number of international drainage basins throughout the world varies somewhat
over time as the number of sovereign nations in the world that share international drainage
basins rises and falls when either existing countries break up (e.g., the former Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia) or new countries are formed (e.g., the countries surrounding the Aral
Sea: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrygistan, and Kazakhistan).
9. See Paisley, supra note 6.
10. Id. at 117.
11. An example of a multilateral international water law treaty would be the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
[Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Opened to Signature, May 21, 1997]
36 I.L.M. 700 (1997), in which Article 2 defines a "watercourse" as "a system of surface
waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole
and normally flowing into a common terminus" and an "international watercourse" as "a
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states." Id. at 704.
12. See Paisley, supra note 6.
13. Id.
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to determine and more difficult to enforce. 4 The relatively more difficult
nature of customary international law flows, in part, from the disparate
components of international custom. These include "the duration of
practice, uniformity of practice, consistency of practice, generality of
application and, arguably, the presence of a requisite sense of legal
obligation."'"
The dominant principle of customary international law currently
governing the utilization of shared transboundary water resources
throughout the world is the "equitable utilization principle," originally
enunciated by the International Law Association (ILA) in its 1966 Helsinki
Rules. 16 The genius of the Helsinki Rules is that they leave room for
varying application by prescribing a "reasonability" test for determining
what is lawful or unlawful conduct in connection with international water
resources. ' The principle of equitable utilization requires states that share
14. Id.
15. Paisley, supra note 6, at 118.
16. Id. at 119.
17. Id. n.41. The statement of the principle of equitable utilization in the Helsinki
Rules is as follows:
Article IV. Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitableshare in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V. (1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article
IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage
area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by
each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin state;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;(g) the comparative costs of alternative means ofsaiisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a
means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State maybe satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
Article VI. A use of category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any
other use or category of uses.
Article VII. A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters
of an international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such
waters.
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an international drainage basin to act reasonably in their utilization of its
waters, and directs that the reasonableness of any utilization be determined
by weighing all relevant factors and by comparing the benefit that would
follow from the utilization with the injury it might do to the interests of
another basin state.'"
The general principles and rules of the customary international law of
fresh water resources, including the Helsinki Rules, continue to play a very
important role even when there is an agreement governing the relations of
states sharing an international drainage basin. This is because international
drainage basin treaties do not stand alone, but are supported by, limited by,
and tested against a set of general international law standards, the content
and validity of which are determined in part by international law and not
entirely by the agreement in question.' 9
1H. ORIGINS AND OPERATION OF THE ICJ AND THE IBWC
A. IJC
By the beginning of the twentieth century, water quality had deterio-
rated along the United States/Canadian border, particularly on the east
coast, to such an extent that both countries felt it was in their interest to
deal with the issue.2" Until this point, water issues had been dealt with by
ad hoc commissions (such as the International Waterways Commission
established in 1905); however, these were not sufficient to handle the
growing water related disputes between Canada and the United States.2 '
Both countries recognized the need for a more permanent body to address
their transboundary water related issues.22
Both Canada and the United States brought their concerns to the
negotiating table.23 The main issue for the United States was sovereignty
-it did not want to lose any political independence in the joint manage-
ment of transboundary waters. It wanted "absolute territorial sovereignty
. over the waters within its territory-tributaries should not be included
in the Commission's authority."2 4 Further, the United States did not want
18. Paisley, supra note 6, at 119-20.
19. Dante A. Caponero, The Role of Customary International Water Law, WATER
RESOURCES POLICY FOR ASIA (Regional Symposium on Water Resource Policy in Agro-
Socio-Economic Development, Dhaka, Bengladesh), Aug. 4-8, 1985, at 365.
20. See Wolf, supra note 1.
21. Id. at32.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
2004]
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the new body to have too much power.25 It thus favored a more ad hoc
nature for the Commission.26
In comparison, Canada's principal concern was the establishment of a
more "egalitarian" relationship with the United States.27 Not only was
Canada's relative size and level of development smaller at the time, but
Canada also had the difficulty of having its foreign policy under the control
of the United Kingdom. It could not negotiate on its own with the United
States. As a result, "negotiations had to be carried out between Ottawa,
Washington, and London.12 In addition to a more equal relationship, and
contrary to the U.S. position, Canada wanted the agreement to include
tributaries and more authority for the Commission.29
Negotiations finally concluded in 1909 when the United States and the
United Kingdom signed the "Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between
the United States and Canada" (Boundary Waters Treaty). The Treaty
represents a compromise of both Canadian and American interests. For
example, "boundary waters" were defined therein as
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers
and connecting waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the
international boundary between the United States and the Domin-
ion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof,
but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels
would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters
flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of
rivers flowing across the boundary."a
Thus, tributaries were not included; however, the United States allowed the
Commission to have greater authority and also accepted its arbitration
function.3 In addition, open and free navigation was accepted for all
boundary waters, as well as for Lake Michigan (the only Great Lake not
defined as a boundary water).32 Each country also reserved the right to
control the use of waters within its jurisdiction while maintaining that
boundary waters were subject to equal and similar rights.33
25. Wolf, supra note 1, at 32.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. International Joint Commission, Boundary Waters Treaty, Preliminary Art.,
available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water. ht ml (last visited Jan. 20,2004) [hereinafter
IJC, Boundary Waters].
31. Wolf, supra note 1, at 32.
32. Id. at 32-33.
33. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 11:14, at 25 (2003).
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[A]ny interference with or diversion from their natural channel of
such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury
on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights
and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such
injury took place in the country where such diversion or interfer-
ence occurs....34
Thus, if a downstream country should suffer damage, that country is
entitled to the same rights as a resident of the offending country.
The Treaty also established an important mechanism called the
International Joint Commission (JC) by which bilateral disputes could be
resolved within a treaty framework.35  The IJC is composed of six
Commissioners. There are three from each country. The President of the
United States, on the advice of the Senate, appoints the American
delegation, while the Governor in Council of Canada appoints the Canadian
delegation upon the advice of the Prime Minister.36 The Commissioners
must then follow the Treaty. However, the Commissioners are supposed
to act impartially, rather than simply represent their respective govern-
ments.37 "This independence is confirmed by Article XII of the Treaty,
which requires Commissioners to make a solemn declaration, in writing,
that they will faithfully and impartially perform their duties under the
Treaty.' '3' This independence is further established through immunity from
judicial process for both the Commission and the Commissioners in both
countries.3 In addition, the Commission's decisions are not subject to
appeal to the courts of either country. In practice, they can only be reversed
by an agreement between the two countries.'
The UC has three main functions:
1. The IJC can make binding decisions and appoint boards of
control to oversee its decisions and recommendations with respect
to "new uses, obstructions or diversions of boundary waters in
either country that affect the natural level or flow of waters in the
34. See IJC, Boundary Waters, supra note 29, at Art. 2.
35. See, IJC, Boundary Waters, supra note 29.
36. International Joint Commission, The International Joint Commission-What it is,
How it Works, available at http://www.ijc.org/en/background/ijc-cinnature.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter IJC, What it is].
37. Id.
38. L.H. Legault, The Roles of Law and Diplomacy in Dispute Resolution: The IJC as
a Possible Model, Address bBfore the Canada-United States Law Institute (Apr. 14, 2000),
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/htm/legaultapril.htln (last visited Feb.
20, 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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other country, [as well as] ... the construction of any works, dams
or other obstructions in rivers that flow from boundary waters, or
rivers that flow across the border, if these projects will raise the
natural level on the other side of the boundary in the upstream
country."
41
2. The UC can investigate and advise the governments on
transboundary issues referred to it. The conclusions and recom-
mendations brought forth from these fact-finding cases are not
legally binding.42
3. The TIC can act as an arbiter for disagreements jointly
submitted to it. The United States must have approval from the
Senate to submit such a case.43
Despite having both a Canadian and an American section, the IJC
generally works as a single unified body to fulfill its functions towards the
common interests of the two countries." Decisions of the IJC must have
the concurrence of at least four Commissioners, though in practice most
decisions are made by consensus. 45 To help it with its responsibilities, the
IJC has also established more than twenty expert boards (e.g., the Great
Lakes Science Advisory Board, the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, and
the International Columbia River Board of Control) to advise it on certain
issues.' For example, the UJC has been called upon to advise Canada and
the United States on issues such as constructing dams or canals, and has
investigated water and pollution in the boundary regions. The Boards are
composed of an equal number of members from each country, whose
'experts' are drawn from various governmental sources as well as the
private sector. 4
The I.C is guided by a number of principles, which include the
following:
The Commission tries to maintain strict impartiality in the
performance of its duties.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Legault, supra note 38. According to Legault, there has never yet been a case
submitted under this Article. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The IJC has been split among national lines only twice in its over ninety year
history, and most decisions have been unanimous. Id.
46. See IJC, Boundary Waters, supra note 30.
47. Legault, supra note 38.
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* The Commission seeks to achieve consensus wherever
possible, both in its own deliberations and those of its boards or
similar bodies. The Commission employs joint fact-finding as a
foundation for building consensus and determining appropriate
action.
0 The Commission is supposed to afford all parties interested in
any matter before it a convenient opportunity to be heard and
promote the engagement of state, provincial and municipal
governments and other authorities in the resolution of these
matters.
* In environmental matters, the Commission affirms the concept
of sustainable development, the ecosystem approach and the virtual
elimination and zero discharge of persistent toxic substances.
0 While emphasizing the importance of a sound scientific basis
for its conclusions and recommendations, the Commission also
recognizes that it may sometimes be necessary to adopt a precau-
tionary approach and to act even in the absence of a scientific
consensus where prudence is essential to protect the public
welfare.4"
The IJC's mandate covers the entire border region. For example, in
1931 it made recommendations concerning the reduction of emissions from
a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, that threatened to become a serious
conflict as a result of airborne pollution reaching the United States.49 In
1944 and again in 1959, the IC investigated and maderecommendations
concerning the apportionment of downstream benefits with respect to the
Columbia River. The IJC's involvement ultimately helped the two
countries reach the 1961 Columbia River Development Treaty.
50
Most of the efforts of the UC have recently been concentrated in the
Great Lakes region. 1 In 1972, Canada and the United States signed the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The aim of the agreement was to
control pollution and clean up waste waters. The IJC was mandated to
assist the governments in their tasks. In 1978, the scope of the agreement
was enlarged to include "persistent toxic chemicals.""2 In 1987, a Protocol
called on the IJC to review "Remedial Action Plans" in forty-three areas of
concern.
48. IJC, What it is, supra note 36.
49. Legault, supra note 38.
50. Id.
51. IJC, What it is, supra note 36.
52 Id.
20041
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:177
The 1987 Protocol implemented an "eco-system" approach to
pollution control, and called for the development of "lakewide
management plans" to combat some critical pollutants. It also
included new emphasis on nonpoint source pollution, groundwater
contamination, contaminated sediment, and airborne toxics."
In 1997, the governments of Canada and the United States asked the
JC to provide a report outlining how the UC could assist the two govern-
ments in facing the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century.54
In this report, the IC outlined five key challenges for the next century:
* Population growth and urbanization;
" Climate change;
• Economic expansion, energy demands and waste generation;
" Technological development; and
* Environmental awareness."
To meet these concerns, the Commission proposed that transboundary
watershed boards be established that would "focus on the overall environ-
mental integrity of each watershed-water, land and air-and monitor and
report on all relevant concerns, including questions of habitat, biodiversity,
exotic species and pollution from all sources."56 While the two federal
governments have agreed in principle to the concept, state and provincial
reactions have ranged from cautious to negative." The Commission is still
pursuing this concept.
In the St. Croix River, Rainy River and Souris River basins, the HC has
also attempted to merge the pollution advisory boards with the existing
control boards and to develop an integrated ecosystem approach to
transboundary watershed management. For example, the International
Souris-Red River Engineering Board has been merged with the Red River
Pollution Board to form a new International Red River Board. The Board
will be a forum for transboundary watershed ecosystem issues, such as
water quality, development and ecosystem health.
Over the years, the IJC has faced its share of criticism, which has
included questioning of its authority and whether or not the limits to that
53. Wolf, supra note 1, at 33.
54. IJC, The IJC and the 21st Century, available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publica
tions/html/2 1 ste.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
55. Id.
56. L.H. Legault, Address at WATERSHED 2000 Conference (July 9-12, 2000),
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/legaultjuly2OOO.ht ml (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004).
57. Id.
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authority are a hindrance to the ecosystem approach called for in 1987."8
Some feel that further powers, "supra-legal powers,"59 are needed. The
Commission's commitment to public participation has also been ques-
tioned.c'
Nevertheless, given the vast number of water resources under its
authority and the myriad layers of government to which it must be
responsible, the Commission is thought to stand out as an institution that
has effectively and peacefully managed the boundary waters of two nations
over ninety years, reconciling or averting more than 130 disputes in the
process."
B. IB WC,
5 2
The IBWC operates between Mexico and the United States and was
established by two primary legal instruments: the Convention of 1889,
which created the International Boundary Commission (IBC), and the 1944
Water Treaty, which changed the name of the IBC to the IBWC.
The 1944 Water Treaty provided that:
58. See Wolf, supra note 1.
59. See id. at 35.
60. See id. The IJC officially states it is committed to public participation:
The Boundary Waters Treaty requires that the Commission give all interested parties
a 'convenient opportunity to be heard' on matters under consideration. The
Commission invites public participation and advice when it undertakes studies under
References, when it deals with Orders of Approval, and when it prepares reports to
Governments.
In many instances, citizens, both specialists and non-specialists, also serve on
Commission boards and task forces.
The Commission is specifically authorized to develop a public information program
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Informing the public of boundary water issues before the Commission is an
important aspect of the work and ways to enhance the Commission's role in this area
are continually explored.
IJC, What is the Boundary Waters Treaty? available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.
html (last visited. Mar. 17, 2004).
61. SeeWolfsupra note 1, at35.
62. See Viviane Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, US.-Mexico Borderland Water
Conflicts and Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973 (2000);
IBWC, The IBWC, Its Mission, Organization and Proceduresfor Solution ofBoundary and
Water Problems, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/htmlaboutus.html (last visited
March 16, 2004); Stephen P. Munme, Reinventing the International Boundary and Water
Commission, 9 BORDERLINES 79, No. 6, (2001), available at
http://www.americaspolicy.orgfborderlines/2001/bl 79ibwc__body.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2004) [hereinafter Mumme].
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0 [T]he IBWC shall in all respects have the status of an interna-
tional body;
a [T]he head of both the American and the Mexican sections
must be an Engineer Commissioner;
* [W]herever Treaty provisions call for joint action or joint
agreement by the two Governments, such matters shall be handled
by or through the Department of State of the United States and the
Secretariat of Foreign Relations of Mexico; and,
* [T]he Commissioner for both the American and the Mexican
section functions under the foreign policy supervision of the
Foreign Office of his or her host Government.63
The mission of the LBWC is:
to apply the rights and obligations which the Governments of the
United States and Mexico assume under the numerous boundary
and water treaties and related agreements, and to do so in a way
that benefits the social and economic welfare of the peoples on the
two sides of the boundary and improves relations between the two
countries.'
Those rights and obligations include:
distribution between the two countries of the waters of the Rio
Grande and of the Colorado River; regulation and conservation of
the waters of the Rio Grande for their use by the two countries by
joint construction, operation and maintenance of international
storage dams and reservoirs and plants for generating hydroelectric
energy at the dams; regulation of the Colorado River waters
allocated to Mexico; protection of lands along the river from floods
by levee and floodway projects; solution of border sanitation and
other border water quality problems; preservation of the Rio
Grande and Colorado River as the international boundary; and
demarcation of the land boundary [between the United States and
Mexico] 65
63. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 62.
64. Id. Some of the other treaties and agreements that are important in a trans-boundary
sense include: the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the 1993 North
American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation to the NAFTA; the La Paz Agreement;
the Border XXI Program; and the NAFTA-created Border Environmental Cooperation
Commission / North American Development Bank.
65. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 61.
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While each country maintains separate headquarters with its own staff
on each respective side of the border, the Commissioners meet weekly and
are in almost daily contact with each other." Cooperative projects carried
out by the IBWC originate in different ways. The IBWC is required to
implement the provisions found in existing treaties and international
agreements. Any joint work done by the IBWC to fulfill these require-
ments necessitates negotiation of specific agreements. These agreements,
made up of decisions or recommendations, are in the form of Minutes
signed by each Commissioner.6 Once approved by each country, the
Minutes are binding on both governments."
"[A] cooperative project may [also] originate with the emergence of a
new boundary or water problem that requires agreement and the coopera-
tion of the two Governments for its solution."69 Once such a problem has
been brought to the attention of the Commission and an investigation shows
that an international project is warranted, the project may be recommended
to both governments. If the project is approved and funded, each Section
carries out its duties under the supervision of the LBWC as outlined in the
agreement.
The mandate of the IBWC is thus a balancing act of treaty obligations
and operational responsibilities."0 The result has been described as "a
bureaucratic hybrid, a diplomatic body overseen by engineers, officially the
servant of the two foreign ministries but politically dominated by the U.S.
Congress.""
IV. OBSERVATIONS / LESSONS
The history and practice of the IJC and the IBWC provide a rich body
of work to review. The two Commissions are similar in many respects.
However, they are also quite different. Are there lessons that the IJC and
the IBWC can learn from each other to better equip themselves to deal with
transboundary water issues in the next millenium? Are there "lessons" that
can be learned from the history and practice of the UC and the IBWC to
help create model institutions for the sustainable management of interna-
tional shared natural resources and transfrontier ecosystems (i.e. eco-
regions housing millions of inhabitants that sprawl across international
66. Id. The U.S. headquarters are located in El Paso, Texas, and the Mexican
headquarters are located in Ciud ad Judrez, Chihuahua. Id. The U.S. Section receives its
authorization and funding from Congress. Id.
67. Bennet & Herzog, supra note 62.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Mumme, supra note 62.
71. Mumme, supra note 62, at I.
20041
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boundaries, most notably in western Europe and North America) through-
out the world?
Some observations on these points, including some criticisms of how
the UC and the IBWC currently operate, follow. First, there are many
important differences between the boundary regions of the United States
and Canada, and those of the United States and Mexico.72 The reasons for
these differences are fundamental and include history, climate, culture,
language and, not unimportantly, the way that U.S. citizens appear to have
been trained to think about Mexico and Mexicans.73 On the southern
boundary, the climate is relatively harsh and arid, cultural differences are
marked, and Mexican law and land tenure contrast with the common law
system inherited by the United States and Canada from England.74
According to at least one critic of the IBWC, the Treaty of 1848, which
established the IBWC, also established a preoccupation with allocation and
a pattern of inequality between the two countries, and this lopsided
relationship has shadowed Mexican/American relationships ever since."
On the northern boundary, Canada and the United States share more of a
common climate, culture and language.7" The result seems to be that the
HC and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 are thought to have been more
respected than the IBWC, both in law and in spirit.77
There are a number of important differences in the way that the UC and
the IBWC appear to function.7s First, a number of the functions of the
IBWC find no counterpart in the HC (i.e., functions such as planning,
design, construction and operation of water storage and related facilities for
the allocation of water between the two countries under specific treaties for
different water bodies, and for drinking water and sanitation). Second,
there is much more specificity of assignments and tasks within the IBWC
in contrast to the flexibility associated with the HC for assigning tasks,
which is widely variable in subject, scope and time. Third, the HC, unlike
the IBWC, has the ability to appoint boards of investigation and implemen-
72. See Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North. America's
Management oflts Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 413 (1993) (summarizing
the results and recommendations of "The North American Experience Managing
International Transboundary Water Resources: International Joint Commission and the
International Boundary and Water Commission" project) [hereinafter Dworsky & Utton].
73. Id. at 440.
74. Id. at441.
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76. Id. at 440.
77. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 72, at 440.
78. Id. See also S.J. Toope & J. Brunnee, Symposium: Law and Civil Society Part V:
Interrelationships Through the Lens ofRegime Theory: Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate
of the International Joint Commission, 15 AiZ. J. INT'L & CowIa. L. 273 (1998); Bennett
& Herzog, supra note 62.
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tation, including representatives of general public interest, over an
unlimited time period to ensure that solutions to problems are sought out
and actually implemented.
Both the IC and the IBWC are currently facing major challenges such
as: increasing risks to water quality and quantity; the linking of border
environments to binational trade agreements; new stresses on public health
and national economies; changes due to population growth and industrial-
ization; greater demands on jointly owned resources; greater demands for
public participation in environmental decision making; greater value being
placed on non traditional water uses (i.e., in stream flows for ecological,
aesthetic and outdoor recreation purposes); and the imperative to establish
more of an "ecosystem approach" to resource management. 9
Both the UC and the IBWC continue to be criticized. For example,
according to one commentator, the IBWC is an "institutional dinosaur; a
stodgy brick-and-mortar agency dominated by engineers; intractable,
defensive; the agent of a central government during a time of decentralized
solutions."'  Put another way, the IBWC is arguably currently not
mandated to deal with all the conflicts now facing water supply in the
United States/Mexico borderland, including toxic waste dumping, sewage
spills, pesticide contamination, conflicts over groundwater, and the politics
of scarce water supply among competing users, including farmers, tourism
developers, industrialists, residents and different levels of government.
[S]ince NAFTA the IBWC's role in managing border water has
been increasingly hemmed in by newer binational commitments
and agencies whose functions overlap its own. Products partly of
frustration with the IBWC's limitations and its failure to respond
to broader environmental concerns in the 1970s and 80s these new
programs and agencies address a wide range of health and environ-
mental problem, many of which transcend the IBWC's treaty
mandated functions. "
Both the HC and the IBWC have seen changes in their constituencies.
For example, until the 1970s, the IBWC's clientele in the United States and
Mexico was almost wholly composed of traditional stakeholders concerned
with defending water endowments and water entitlements to the almost
complete exclusion of other interests.82 However, environmentalists,
economic justice advocates and other constituencies for sustainable
development are today increasingly influential in the border community.
79. Id.
80. Mumme, supra note 62.
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82. Id. at 4.
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These new constituents are increasingly concerned with such issues as
drought management, groundwater management and ecological preserva-
tion. According to one critic, the IBWC is handicapped in responding to
these new constituents by an IBWC treaty that either failed to anticipate
many of these problems or underestimated their magnitude. 3 Among the
IBWC's more glaring omissions are groundwater allocation, mechanisms
for sharing water from lesser streams and rivers, consideration of
ecologically-based water needs, and lack of an ecosystem-based orienta-
tion."
The LJC appears to have a stronger and more powerful institutional
structure than the IBWC. However, according to at least one critic, the
relatively strong institutional structure of the UC is somewhat misleading,
and while the procedural evolution of the IJC suggests a capacity for the
generation of progressive substantive norms, the constrained scope of the
IJC's mandate practically precludes normative innovation.85Although the UC has yet to evolve into a producer of substantive
norms, this does not mean that the JC is irrelevant or ineffective. 6 In
actual fact, the IJC appears to have helped to resolve a large number of
potential disputes concerning the diversion of waters. 7 Even more
importantly, it has served as the focus for significant fact-finding and
investigation into important environmental issues, including those affecting
the Great Lakes basin.88 The HC is also not without influence. 9 According
to two observers
various HIC reports contain references to emerging principles of
international environmental law; its public fora allow for the active
participation of NGOs in decision making; and, the publicity
generated by all of this work helps to create political pressure upon
governments that may counterbalance the interests of industry and
organized labor. Ultimately, such pressures may prompt the
negotiation of harder regimes of substantive norms focussed upon
ecosystem sustainability. At the very least they help to shape the
attitudes of actors within the bureaucracy and government as they
consider the policy options available in any given context. The IC
is also a useful monitoring agency, and a source of information
83. Id. at 4-5.
84. Id.
85. See Toope and Brunnee, supra note 78, at 285-86.
86. Id. at 286.
87. See Wolf, supra note 1, at 35.
88. See Toope and Brunnee, supra note 78, at 286.
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Transboundary Water Management
which can support public lobbying efforts to influence governmen-
tal decision-making. 9
Proposals to turn the IJC into a full fledged adjudicatory agency with
independent powers of enforcement are thought, by at least one IC critic,
to be misconceived, or at best, premature.
[T]hey are likely to result in a lessening of the actual influence of
the Commission, for the United States and Canada will simply
ensure that important issues engaging multifaceted interests are
reserved for a political track. Any reforms to the UC should focus
upon improvements at a procedural level, to expedite the fact-
finding function. In the longer term, if a political commitment to
ecosystem protection grows, the IC may evolve into a more
autonomous institution with powers of norm-generation. But any
such development is a long way off. Meanwhile, the HC is useful
and modestly influential. Turning it into a pseudo-judicial entity
would undermine, not enhance, its effectiveness. 9'
Analysis of the HC and the IBWC suggests that designing institutions
for transboundary water resource management is a perilous undertaking and
that the result must necessarily vary widely based on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case. However, there is a great deal to be
said for trying to design institutions for transboundary natural resources
management in an adaptive way.
Adaptive institutions are those institutions, like the IJC, that end up
following the principles of active adaptive management. Active adaptive
management involves learning by doing, and when done right, it provides
a foundation to improve the basis for action through experimentation. It
incorporates five basic principles:
* Protecting and restoring living resources as a common
objective of everyone involved;
* Treating and administering "projects" as experiments;
0 Acting instead of deferring action until we "know enough";
0 Valuing information as a basis for action and a product of
action; and
* Managing ecosystems for as long as mankind exists, but
realizing the unlikelihood of developing ultimate solutions.
90. Id. at 287.
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The great advantage of active adaptive management is that it not only is
conducive to the application of the "precautionary approach," but that it
allows for action in the face of scientific uncertainty and keeps the
powerful problem solving characteristics of the scientific method continu-
ously engaged in the service of policy development.
